Sports Teaching, Traditional Games, and Understanding in Physical Education: A Tale of Two Stories by Martínez-Santos, R. et al.
fpsyg-11-581721 September 23, 2020 Time: 21:43 # 1
CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS




South Ural State University, Russia
Reviewed by:
Jorge Serna,
University of Lleida, Spain
João Francisco Ribas,








This article was submitted to
Movement Science and Sport
Psychology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 09 July 2020
Accepted: 17 August 2020
Published: 25 September 2020
Citation:
Martínez-Santos R, Founaud MP,
Aracama A and Oiarbide A (2020)
Sports Teaching, Traditional Games,
and Understanding in Physical
Education: A Tale of Two Stories.
Front. Psychol. 11:581721.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.581721
Sports Teaching, Traditional Games,
and Understanding in Physical
Education: A Tale of Two Stories
Raúl Martínez-Santos1* , María Pilar Founaud2* , Astrid Aracama3 and Asier Oiarbide3
1 Department of Physical Education and Sports, Faculty of Education and Sport, University of the Basque Country,
Vitoria-Gasteiz, Spain, 2 Department of Didactics of the Musical, Plastic and Corporal Expression, Faculty of Education,
University of Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Spain, 3 Department of Physical Education and Sports, University of the Basque Country,
Vitoria-Gasteiz, Spain
Unlike Dickens’s novel, this is not a tale of light and darkness, order and chaos, good
and evil. . . It is, though, a story worth to be told about two standpoints about games and
sports, teaching and research, physical education simply put, that have pursued similar
interests on parallel tracks for too long, despite their apparent closeness and shared
cultural grounds. The objective of this conceptual analysis is to try and reconcile two
perspectives, namely motor praxeology and teaching games for understanding (TGfU),
born in the last third of the XX century in France and England with the intention to rethink
the foundations of physical education (PE) and sports teaching. Pierre Parlebas, from
the French side of the English Channel, claimed in 1967 that sports make part of PE,
that team sports must be considered from a specific, sociomotor point of view, and
that motor conducts (i.e., the significative organisation of motor behaviour), not sports
techniques, are the corner-stone of PE and sports coaching. In the early 1980s, from
the English side of La Manche, Almond, Thorpe, and Bunker made a plea for a shift
in the way to teach games (sporting collective duels mostly), deeply concerned by the
negative impact of the traditional technics-centred approach on motivation, competence
and attained level of the least able in school situations. Our conclusion is that TGfU, or
game-based approaches to sports coaching and teaching, can take great advantage
of the motor-praxeological rationale for three reasons: firstly, because concepts like
understanding, game sense and action principles are operatively, semiotically linked to
the reality of the playing process; secondly, because the inner structures of the games
that constrain players and guide their motor conducts, permit to integrate games in
the general system of sporting games, no matter their level of institutionalisation; finally,
because any motor intervention process is better thought of and more systematically
developed upon the operational concepts of internal logic and expected practical effects
of game playing. This time, Paris could be the place to go to in search of solutions, not
the city to run away from in hope of consolation.
Keywords: traditional game, physical education, philosophy of sport, learning transfer, motor praxeology, TGfU,
semiotricity
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GAMES, TRADITIONS, AND PHYSICAL
EDUCATION
Traditional sporting games, those activities collected by Brueghel
the Elder (1560), Stella (1657); Gomme (1894), and Grupos
Etniker Euskalerria (1993), constitute a major asset for physical
education (PE) in three ways at least: epistemologically, they
allow us to think about what human action and motricity
are in relation to culture, history, and society; pedagogically,
they let us consider what our options are when proposing
aims and designing curricula; and didactically, they impel us
to question what our resources can be when teaching in PE
and sports. The troubled waters of the 1960s, a decade that
started with the fall of an “iron curtain” and finished with
the rise of humankind to the moon, also stirred the way
games and sports were considered on both sides of the English
Channel in regard to PE. In this sense, we intend to reflect
on those three topics while trying to find an answer to a
question we have put some thought on lately: Why are traditional
games absent from the Teaching Games for Understanding
(TGfU) rationale?
In mai 68, another revolution was en marche in the Midlands
that would definitively affect for the better the way that hundreds
of thousands of pupils around the world confront games and
sports at schools. It is well known how Thorpe et al. (1986;
Sánchez-Gómez et al., 2014) gathered in Loughborough a group
of PE teachers, lecturers, and scholars concerned by the way
games were being used in primary and secondary schools. Over
time, that project developed by “the games team” became one
of the most recognisable currents in contemporary PE and an
inspiration for interesting academic debates, no matter how
close they may be to the original project (Kirk, 2017). Presented
originally by Thorpe and Bunker as a model for teachers, TGfU’s
six phases of instruction is a fruitful combination of pedagogical
concerns, didactical needs, and theoretical reflections that
harnessed and channelled the interest of many PE professionals in
the English-speaking world. On his part, Pierre Parlebas spent the
Beatles decade in Paris lecturing and training Olympic athletes at
the École Normal Supérier d’Éducation Physique (Parlebas, 2014)
and getting a degree in psychology and other minor qualifications
in sociology, linguistics, and mathematics to develop the project
of a scientific physical education sketched in his first, visionary
paper: Éducation physique et éducation philosophique (Parlebas,
1959). Twenty-five years later, he successfully applied for the
position of professor at the Faculty of Sociology of La Sorbonne,
after having obtained at it his state doctorate claiming, in front of
an egregious panel, that “sporting game and motor action belong
to a specific field of research endowed with an original scientific
pertinence” (Parlebas, 1985b, p. 90). In proving so, he has given
us the conceptual and methodological resources to act and reflect
on PE in the form of a scientific framework, and enough evidence
of the richness and importance of motor traditional games for
school pupils, university students, PE practitioners, and coaches
alike (Parlebas, 1985a, 1998, 2001, 2003a,b, 2010a,b).
Unlike Dickens’s novel, this is not a tale of light and darkness,
order and chaos, good and evil. . . It is, though, a story worth
to be told about two perspectives on games and sports, on
teaching and research, on physical education simply put, which
may have been inspired by similar aims, but driven on parallel
tracks for too long despite their geographical closeness and shared
historical backgrounds. Therefore, our main objective is to try
and articulate two perspectives, namely, “teaching games for
understanding” (Thorpe et al., 1986) and “motor praxeology”
(Parlebas, 2013), both born in the last third of the twentieth
century to rethink the foundations of physical education (PE) and
sports teaching. It is somehow a what if kind of story in the vein of
Stolz and Pill (2016), a fictional game sometimes, but not useless
nor stupid: What would TGfU be like today if Thorpe, Bunker,
Almond, and Parlebas had met at the right time? As we hope to
prove, this is a pertinent search of conceptual clarification and
mutual enrichment in which those humble, youthful traditional
sporting games play a key role when looking into three main
questions of PE and TGfU: what those activities we call games
are, what the consequences of their inclusion in PE can be, and
what the principles for their teaching should be.
ON GAME’S DEFINITION AND GAMES’
CATEGORIES
Game and sport are extremely polysemic words. Probably not
by chance did Wittgenstein chose “game” to illustrate his theory
of meaning: “Consider for example the proceedings that we call
‘games.’ I mean board games, card games, ball games, Olympic
games, and so on. What is common to them all? – Don’t
say: ‘There must be something common, or they would not
be called games’ – but look and see whether there is anything
common to all. – For if you look at them you will not see
something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships,
and a whole series of them at that” (1953: Wittgenstein, 1963,
p. 31). Wittgenstein claimed that we can use a word properly
without being able to produce its proper definition, as we do with
numbers. However, competent use of a word is just the first level
of clarity we can attain, as Charles S. Peirce believed: “Merely
to have such an acquaintance with the idea as to have become
familiar with it, and to have lost all hesitancy in recognising it in
ordinary cases, hardly seems to deserve the name of clearness of
apprehension” (Peirce, 1878, p. 2). Peirce, possibly the greatest
North American philosopher, identified definitions as the second
level of clarity: “By the contents of an idea logicians understand
whatever is contained in its definition. So that an idea is distinctly
apprehended, according to them, when we can give a precise
definition of it, in abstract terms” (Peirce, 1878, p. 3).
TGfU is a real academic endeavour (Werner and Almond,
1990; Hopper and Bell, 2001), but it is hard to find in its
vast literature a proper discussion about what is understood
when the word “game” is uttered in this field, no matter how
consistent the use of the word “game” may be. The members
of the games team were committed to the practice of PE but
did not lack influence and inspiration by key academics, such as
the philosopher Bernard Suits, the educational thinker Lawrence
Stenhouse, and the psychologist Jerome Bruner (Harvey et al.,
2018). Precisely, Bernard Suits, whose What is a game? (1967) and
The Grasshopper (1978) are still today fruitful in the philosophy
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of sport, has been acknowledged as a major influence in the
construction of TGfU, which makes this apparent absence of
reflection on the nature of game even more intriguing, and
certainly due to something else than lack of awareness or interest.
It looks like the early authors of TGfU did not need to define
what a game is because everybody knew what we are talking
about: “Physical activities using an object that are played in
society, for example football, tennis, golf, and softball” (Hopper
and Bell, 2001, p. 14), or, as Mauldon and Redfern said in
their Games teaching: “An activity in which a minimum of two
people, themselves on the move, engage in competitive play
with a moving object within the framework of certain rules”
(Mauldon and Redfern, 1969, p. 1).
Nonetheless, the inquiry on the nature of game-playing is as
controversial as helpful for PE thinkers in terms of curriculum
building and teaching practice because it is not a simple one: Suits
declared that “play, game, and sport” are a tricky conceptual triad
(1988) when it comes to characterising different ludic experiences
and activities, so tricky as to lead him and his contender
Meier (1988) to commit in Schneider’s opinion a “category
mistake” (Schneider, 2001, p. 151). The Gordian problem of
game’s definition was resolved by Parlebas with a clear-cut, new
referent: “For us, a sporting game is any motor situation of
regulated confrontation, so-called ‘game’ and ‘sport’ by social
organisations. [. . .] Certainly poor regarding its notional content,
this definition serves mainly identifying purposes, pointing at
repertoires of practices proposed by federal or educational
organisations” (Parlebas, 1986, p. 46), and leading to some
interesting logical consequences: board games, like chess, are not
sporting games; sporting games are legal entities that regulate
human motor action; and playing tags and playing football belong
to the same category of “sporting game,” no matter their level of
institutionalisation.
As shown in Figure 1, “ludomotricity” (Parlebas, 1999, L:56)1,
the total of situations associated with playful motor situations,
can be categorised using a few but distinctive traits, giving
as a result what Parlebas described as a spectacular ludorama
(Parlebas, 2008):
• Swimming, jogging, skating, etc., are free, self-organised
actions that impose no restriction whatsoever on the agents,
reason why they cannot be properly called games, but
“quasi-games.”
• Hand clapping games, like My mummy sent me shopping
and A sailor went to sea, or more recent games like the cup
challenge, are the minimum expression of the class “motor
game,” that is, activities that impose on the players prefixed
bodily behaviours that can be valued accomplished or not
without establishing a true competition, that is, without
calls by referees or umpires.
• Athletics, football, tennis, and the likes are “sports”:
institutionalised motor competitions, sporting games with
1This book is online at https://books.openedition.org/insep/1067; the reason why
all references will be related to this online edition, and any citation, will be
identified by the initial letter of the term in French, the chapter it is included in,
and the ordinal number of the paragraph: L:56 is the 56th paragraph in chapter L.
constitutive rules for players and roles for rules-making and
disciplinary action.
• The largest part of “sporting games” are not
institutionalised, or they are administrated by local or
regional governing bodies: in this case, we can call them
“quasi-sports” (i.e., Highland games or traditional bowling
games), or “traditional games” when they show no level of
organisation at all (i.e., hide-and-seek, tags, etc.). Besides,
“street games,” like self-organised basketball (Bordes et al.,
2013), and certain “videogames,” the so-called exergames,
for instance, belong to this ample category too.
This system of ludomotor categories addresses two capital
questions on games and PE: their motor nature and the different
levels of constriction that operate on the players. Motor situations
constitute a special case of Goffman’s situation: “I would define
a social situation as an environment of mutual monitoring
possibilities, anywhere within which an individual will find
himself accessible to the naked senses of all others who are
‘present,’ and similarly find them accessible to him. According
to this definition, a social situation arises whenever two or more
individuals find themselves in one another’s immediate presence,
and it lasts until the next-to-last person leaves” (Goffman,
1964, p. 135). What makes them special is that both the
process and the result of a ludomotor situation depend on the
bodily configuration of the agents’ behaviours, which always are
connected to the overall meaning of the encounter. For this
reason, any element of the situation receives “motor” as a family
name because their bodily, physical nature is the essence of this
unique kind of experience that characterises PE.
Swimming or climbing, hand-clapping or playing tags, fishing
of racing, and playing soccer or rugger are all motor actions
consisting of processes “of accomplishment of the motor
conducts of one or more individuals acting in a determined
motor situation” (Parlebas, 1999, A:1), embodiments of a kind
of human action that owns very specific properties (Bordes
et al., 2007): it is constrained by the physical and biological
laws that operate on individuals, species, and material world;
it is constitutive to the task to perform, which disappears if
the action is not accomplished (means and results are equally
necessary); and it is real action, not symbolic (like in board
games) nor substitutive (like in competitive videogames). Game-
playing is meaningful in itself and independent of its technical
sophistication or skill development: the Sunday round of four
pals over handicap 20 makes so much sense for the players as the
afternoon singles in the last Ryder Cup, and playing darts is as
bodily an action as figure-skating.
Having said so, sporting games are not only physical but also
cultural realities independent of what agents can think they are.
Sporting games are linguistic, juridical entities that create specific
action spheres easily transmitted by word (Martínez-Santos,
2018). TGfU pays paramount attention to “rules”: linguistic
utterances whose function is to orient and regulate human
action (Robles, 1984), because not only games are created by
rules, but teaching activities too. The capability to play games
relies on a general linguistic competence that makes games
interpretable and transformable into bodily conducts, which is
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FIGURE 1 | System of categories of ludic motor situations (Parlebas, 2008).
the same competence that allows teachers to make understand
the game (Martínez-Santos and Oiarbide, 2020). Briefly put,
rules are necessary to decree the elements of the game, that is,
to create competition: the accepted motor procedures and the
consequences associated with acts and results. “Consequences”
are, in fact, the most important part of these juridical systems
we call games: on one side, they value acts and keep a record
of the players’ merit to outperform; on the other side, they
establish how agents must proceed in case of infringement. Any
moral value of game playing depends on the acceptance of
its internal consequences and the development of the juridical
intelligence that wraps tactical awareness, which in the games we
are dealing with is based on the “principle of sanction” (Robles,
1984): rule-breaking has as consequence damage that sometimes
affects one’s score (i.e., volleyball and judo) and some others
does not (i.e., basketball and hockey). Moreover, this juridical
nature allows circumventing the annoying thesis of the “logical
incompatibility” (Morgan, 1987) between breaking the rules and
the existence of the game.
It may seem a minor question, but these three criteria, namely,
motricity, regulation, and institutionalisation, help us mitigate
Wittgenstein’s blurriness and advance in Peircean clarity when it
comes to exploring physical activities. Sports are institutionalised
sporting games that “have been selected and consecrated by social
institutions that have put them into their structures of production
and consumption” (Parlebas, 1986, p. 46). There is no doubt that
games in TGfU are motor competitions, but it seems very clear
as well that they are only competitions managed by international
governing bodies, and there is a chance that sports federations
and school institutions have different understandings of what
production and consumption are or should be.
ON GAMES IN PHYSICAL EDUCATION
Sports are a tradition in PE. We are so accustomed to their
presence that it is felt natural, inevitable, and indisputable.
However, as we have learnt above, acquaintance is just the
dimmest level of clarity, and conceiving PE as school sports
practice would be no definition but a mere description of
the research object we would eventually like to understand.
Peirce translated the third and highest level of clarity into his
famous pragmatic maxim: “Consider what effects, which might
conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of
our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is
the whole of our conception of the object” (Peirce, 1878, p. 20).
Our educational decisions, theoretical classification systems,
conceptual or empirical diagrams, hypothesis and beliefs, etc.,
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are examples of practical bearings that Peirce considered to be
signs of intelligence in action. In this sense, understanding what
sporting games are also depends on discussing why they belong
to education, firstly, and what the consequences of our including
sports in PE are, secondly.
In a world as utopian as The Grasshopper’s kingdom imagined
by Bernard Suits (Suits, 1978), The Monty Python comedy troupe
depicted a British government with a Ministry of Silly Walks.
This memorable sketch (The Monty Python, 1970) depicts an
applicant trying to show and prove that his gait is as silly as
to deserve public funding, and a public servant analysing his
merits in a very professional way: “It’s not particularly silly,
is it? I. . . I mean, the right leg isn’t silly at all, and the left
leg merely does a forward aerial half-turn every alternate step.”
The postulant’s initial disappointment turns into joy when he is
offered “a research fellowship on the Anglo-French silly walk”: La
marche futile! Isn’t it possible that to many a ministry of PE and
sports be as comical and useless as the one created by The Monty
Python, apparently to criticise the Concorde’s project? Maybe, but
it is almost sure that to many, and not only to those fans standing
on the bleachers, traditional sporting games are childish, minor
games in comparison to pay-per-view sports. However, quite on
the contrary, there could be a point in thinking that any uncritical
inclusion of sports artificial techniques in PE might reduce any
allegedly educational game to nothing more than another silly
walk in search for a generous, even sillier public servant to be
turned into a fan.
On Sports and Physical Education
“To those advocates of TGfU derivates that seek to produce
excellent games players in specific sports coaching contexts,
such as Games Sense, Bunker and Thorpe were not, at least
originally, ever concerned with sports coaching pedagogy. For
those who claim that TGfU emerged without a substantial
theoretical framework, the problem Bunker and Thorpe were
seeking to resolve was practical and pedagogical, concerned
with institutional school physical education.” He who reminds
us of this is Kirk (2017, p. 19), deeply interested in making
clear that “TGfU-informed games teaching was intended to
fit into same spaces that sports-techniques based physical
education occupied” (p. 21) after the English 1946 Education
Act. This Act raised compulsory education to 15 years of age
and boosted the development of the PE curriculum for “mass
secondary education.” Before WW2 “women had dominated
physical education teaching as a profession until the 1940s,
but these post-war developments required the training of a
large number of male physical educators” (p. 20): the extension
of schooling included the puberty period, which is why “the
dominant and deeply gendered form of physical education at
this time, based on gymnastics and movement, made single-
sex classes seem highly appropriate.” As Kirk accounts: “The
men preferred a sports-based form of their field in contrast
to the female-dominated gymnastics past, and a massive
reconfiguration and reconstruction of school physical education
was underway” (Kirk, 2017, p. 20).
To Ellen Singleton: “Games are such a large and integral
part of the content of PE classes that any change in the
pedagogical approach to games indicates changes to our shared
educational philosophy about student’s needs – their methods
of learning, their interests and attitudes, and their physical
capacities” (Singleton, 2010, p. 27). This is the key question
about any activity included in PE classes, and her narration of
how games made their way into Canadian PE indicates that it
was related to the Deweyan conception of play, “games, dance,
and sports” in primary, while it was a chance for PE secondary
teachers to “justify the introduction of more intense forms of
competition, particularly into classes for males students” (p. 24).
As a consequence: “Intense competitive team sports were, by
the middle of the century, mainstay in American and Canadian
males physical education programs [. . .]. Over time, the emphasis
on games in physical education has shifted from the question
of whether games should be included in the curriculum, to
questions about how games should be taught” (p. 25). Mauldon
and Redfern’s experience seems mostly congruent: “The subject
of Games is one which, as yet, has merited little genuinely serious
attention. It is, of course, part of that plethora of multifarious
activities which collectively are known as Physical Education, but
whereas other major branches of this (notably dance, gymnastics,
and swimming) have received certain amount of consideration in
respect of education, the teaching of games continues in the main
to be carried on along traditional and even stereotyped lines,
with few questions asked as to the reasons for its inclusion in the
curriculum” (Mauldon and Redfern, 1969, p. vi).
Sport is the product of the institutionalisation of games
occurred in England in the nineteen century (During, 1984;
Mangan, 1986), and it makes part of PE because they are motor
activities whose practice can produce valuable effects on the
multiple dimensions of personality. Even though, ex post facto
argumentations that try to justify pedagogical decisions that
never existed do not take into account that the same beneficial
effects can be obtained with other kinds of activities. According
to Parlebas (1986, p. 246), institutionalisation is mainly driven
by the high economic value of sports competitions as spectacular
sources of entertainment, but it is also linked to “foundational
ethical imperatives” that seem today as unquestionable as ever:
“Sport remains strangely associated with values which it does
not respect as a mass phenomenon, but which help to maintain
its positive image” (Parlebas, 1999, S:323) and stop many from
making sticky questions: Do we really need to play federation
games most often? Do they have a higher educational value than
traditional games? (1978: Parlebas, 2017, p. 349–355).
The answer to this double question is a double no: “Federated
games are not characterised by an uninterested educational
richness, but by their value as spreaders of a certain power”
(1978: Parlebas, 2017, p. 353), and sports prevail “because
they are adult games that adjust to the powers with full
command, and eventually to some of their counterpowers.”
Even if, “analysing the sports phenomenon in terms of power
does not necessarily imply condemning it: there is no society
without an institution, nor an institution without power, and
the gratuitous condemnation of sport is as ideological as its
blind glorification.” The vindication of traditional games does
not imply the vilification of sports, for it would be useless and
unfair: today, as it was at the time, “it seems almost un-British
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to suggest that education could be complete without games!”
(Mauldon and Redfern, 1969, p. 2), and no one with sound
judgment should try to tackle a whole Empire: “This will be a
perfect planet//only when the Game shall enter//every country,
teaching millions//how to ask for Leg or Centre” (Gale, 1930, In
Mangan, 2012). Should we?
On the Consequences of
Institutionalisation
The consequences of our including sports in PE curricula are
the consequences of the institutionalisation of sports. In this
sense, basketball, a game invented in 1891 by a PE teacher
who got inspired by a traditional game, that was proposed in
winter to a group of troublemakers as an alternative to the
boring calisthenics, that in less than a decade spread all over
America thanks to an educational institution, that got into the
sports show-business by the turn of the century. . ., makes the
perfect example (Naismith, 1941) to understand the intimate
relationship between PE and sports. Basketball was such a
successful new game because it abode perfectly by the sports
model: a time-limited duel between two equal teams, quantitative
and qualitatively speaking, that binds players together on a
relational network based on constant loyalty and equal chances
(Parlebas, 2002, p. 211). However, if human relationships in
the real world can also be inconstant, unstable, and logically
irrational, are sports the best way to learn about the others,
about life in society, about the dialectical relationship between
individual agency and collective systems? In other words: Can
we really be convinced about the contribution of team sports
to children’s socialisation (Parlebas, 1978a, 2017, p. 357)? Is
sports socialisation really better than traditional socialisation
(Etxebeste, 2012)?
Structurally speaking, sport is not perforce any better than
traditional game. On the contrary, as far as socialisation is
concerned, traditional games put in play human communication
models far more diverse and enriching than sports:
All sporting games, whatever they may be, can be put at
the service of authority, although traditional games, as a
whole, are much less favourable than sport to the exercise of
centralised and authoritarian power, for two main reasons.
The first is that the rules of many traditional games propose
uses of space, types of communication, criteria of success
and possibilities of group decision that do not favour the
establishment of an external, undisputed authority. The
second is that the variety of situations generated by these
games causes motor behaviours through extremely different
exchange systems. A variety of this type, which responds
to sometimes contradictory norms and attitudes, makes it
difficult to unilaterally channel motor conducts towards a rigid
system, towards a strict social shaping of the body (1978b:
Parlebas, 2017, 354).
School sports practice can suppose the massive reproduction
of just a few of the many relational configurations available, the
“reproduction” (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1981) of exclusive-stable
communication models that leave aside many other forms of
antagonism and cooperation that offer interaction opportunities
more suitable to dive into to the depths of human relationships.
As shown above in Figure 2, according to their “motor
communication networks” (Parlebas, 1999, R:26) and “network
of changes of sociomotor roles” (R:50), sports are only present
in four of the 10 categories of sporting games, and games
in TGfU belong almost only to two of them: symmetric and
dissymmetric duels. All sports’ communication networks are
n-exclusive (any two participants cannot be at the same time
partners and opponents), stable (the initial relationship between
any two players is kept unchanged till the end of the competition),
complete (in sociomotor networks there is always a positive or
negative relationship between any two players, never neutral),
and balanced (intra-team relationships are always positive
and inter-team relationships always negative) (Parlebas, 1986,
p. 235). Conversely, traditional games accept instability (alliances,
friendship, and antagonism that change along the time) and
ambivalence (uncertainty about the others’ real intentions to help
or harm one’s interests), making possible for the players to enjoy
the relational possibilities offered by playing situations not fully
predetermined by outer institutions.
Many tagging games possess exclusive-unstable networks with
three role-changing possibilities: permutation of roles between
the two players involved in a catch; convergence of all tagged
players into the chasing role; and fluctuation of roles due to role
changing without a strict order. Many other games, those which
Parlebas (2010b, 2011a) likes to call paradoxical, give room for
even more liberty to choose: all the fun in a game as simple
as “puss in the corner” comes from the choice that any player
on a corner can make to be loyal to or betray the comrades on
the other corners. Can anybody imagine a better way to express
oneself than a situation in which any decision is a declaration of
hate or love? In this sense, can there be any better way to learn
simple moral principles than putting them at play? There is no
doubt that sports can offer remarkable educational experiences,
but from a pedagogical point of view their practice comes along
with a double jeopardy we must be aware of from the pedagogical
angle: that of reducing action to movement, and that of reducing
interaction to obedience. What a challenge!
ON TRADITIONAL GAMES,
UNDERSTANDING, AND TEACHING AS
COMMUNICATION
Traditional sporting games have helped us make our point about
two issues on which later TGfU seems less interested than the
founding fathers: the nature and classification of motor games,
and the educational consequences of disregarding sporting games
other than sports. The inquiry on efficiency in games teaching
received much attention in the mid twentieth century, not only
in France and Britain: for instance, Mahlo (1969), from the
German Democratic Republic, developed a remarkable work on
the “tactical act” for 6- to 10-year-old socialist students greatly
based on the psychologist Sergei Rubinstein’s ideas. Thorpe
et al. (1986) realised that technical conception of games and
teaching is detrimental to the legitimate aspirations of physical
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FIGURE 2 | Networks of motor communications: comparison between sports and traditional games (modified from Parlebas, 1986, p. 238).
educationists and the best interest of pupils, that a call should
be made “away from a skills-based lesson and towards a more
cognitively based approach” (5). Almost two decades earlier,
Parlebas defended the same in his first paper: “Philosophical
training has familiarised physical education teachers with the
universe of meanings, symbols and values, empowering them to
not just be technicians or lessons providers; it has taught them to
be independent of stereotyped structures by showing the dangers
of surrendering to banal techniques, however magnificent they
might be” (1959: Parlebas, 2017).
In 1967, Allen Wade, Football Association’s Director of
Coaching, published a book that, as we know, was revolutionary
and inspiring: The F.A. guide to training and coaching (Wade,
1979). Written for teachers and coaches alike, it was promoted
as follows “The theme of the book takes full account of modern
tactical development and emphasises the need for the modern
footballer to ‘read the game’ and understand the systems and
tactics that are outlined.” There are radical differences between
our conceptual model of game-playing and Wade’s analysis
based on the dyad technique/skill, but his references to common
factors, unpredictability, interference of intentions, cooperation
and opposition, and decision making (1967: Wade, 1979, p. 180)
are an outstanding prove of wisdom and strength for what TGfU
would become. In actual fact, the interest gained by the “sports-
coaching turn” (Kirk, 2017, p. 19) is far from being inadequate
nor unexpected: it is the cornerstone of our double story, because
any general proposal for school PE ignoring the internal logic of
teaching situations is doomed to grow on wasted lands.
On Understanding as Semiosis
As Wade (1979) pointed out, unpredictability, decision-making,
collaboration, opposition, and interference of intentions are the
key elements of football-playing, because football and all team
duels belong to the “motor action domain” (Parlebas, 1999, D:74)
in which collaboration and opposition occur at the same time. It
is the presence of opponents what willy-nilly generates on the
players decisional uncertainty no matter their competence. From
the learning side, we conceive understanding as the competence
to put in play the principles of game-playing associated with
the “internal logic” (Parlebas, 1999, L:4) that emerges from the
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interpretation of the game’s rules; from the teaching side, we
conceive understanding as the competence to assess and increase
the level of clarity that the players’ conducts show in relation to
the internal logic of the situation. From both sides, “uncertainty:
Property of unpredictability attached to certain elements of a
situation” (Parlebas, 1999, I:1), is the most imperative praxic
consequence of the game system, for it determines how games
must be solved and how players must be trained in terms
of decision-making. Generally speaking, the two sources of
uncertainty in sporting games, namely, “social” and “spatial,” can
be operationalised with three binary variables that inform about
the presence or absence of uncertainty due to the relationships
with “partners,” “opponents,” or “space.” The combination of
these tree dichotomic traits results in a classification with eight
motor action domains that, individually, propose equivalent
experiences, and collectively allow to understand and manage the
total of ludomotor activities (Parlebas, 1999, C:1).
TGfU is mostly about teaching to understand sports opposition
in the form 2-exclusive-stable communication networks
networks, that is, duels of teams or individuals: only one of
Elli’s eight categories (Ellis, 1983), concretely “unopposed target
games” like bowling and golf, lacks opposition, and Almond
(1986) does not even make such a distinction in his “target
games” category. We have seen above (Figure 2) that sporting
duels are only two of the many cases in sporting games, but
it is also true they constitute a subset of motor tasks in which
instrumental praxic communication reigns: in sporting duels
motor interaction is purely strategical, driven by the scoring
system, and built semiotically upon the bodily procedures
permitted by the rules. Goffman’s description of “strategic
interaction” is a remarkable account of how antagonising,
deceptive interaction works: “In every social situation we can
find a sense in which one participant will be an observer with
something to gain from assessing expressions, and another will
be a subject with something to gain from manipulating this
process. A single structure of contingencies can be found in this
regard which renders agents a little us all and all of us a little like
agents” (Goffman, 1969, p. 81). Although he did not look into
their semiotic grounds, his analysis of the so-called “expression
games” is as inspiring as accurate his distinction of unwitting,
naïve, covering, uncovering and counter-uncovering moves.
Peirce defined “semiosis” as the action of signs, and
Parlebas chose “semiotics” (Saussurean semiology actually) as
the cornerstone of his epistemology: “Sport is a world of signs:
of signs, not of stimuli. Is it possible to carry on treating
players in action as they were stimulus-response mechanisms?
Is it possible to be content with analysing their acts from the
Pavlovian model of conditioning? Sporting game is a place
riddled with immediate, literally embodied meanings: each motor
behaviour carries a meaning that the other participants must
interpret to act appropriately. Sitting-ball players, like basketball
players, try to extract tactical meanings from the acts that
interweave before them” (Parlebas, 2017, p. 277). “Semiotricity:
field and nature of motor situations considered from the angle
of the use of sign systems directly related to the participants’
motor conducts” (Parlebas, 1999, S:43), really puts “meaning”
in the centre of teaching, learning, and research, allowing to
outpace mechanistic, dualistic conceptions of PE, in the first
place, and dualistic, technique-based sports coaching at any
level of analysis, as a consequence. This semiotic nature of
motor conducts makes them the cornerstone of PE, therefore
understood as the pedagogy of motor conducts (E:11), and casts
off any reductionist, dualist conceptions of human beings: “The
term ‘movement,’ so often invoked in physical education still
today, is notoriously inadequate and the prove of that old
conception, which takes into account the product and not the
producing agent. The notion of movement refers to the idea of
a bio-mechanical body defined by displacements observed from
the outside; it is somewhat concerned with describing gestural
‘utterances’ from which the subject is excluded as such and whose
culmination is ‘the’ technique, the abstract and depersonalised
gestural model” (C:108).
From this angle, any player’s “motor conduct: meaningful
organisation of motor behaviours” (Parlebas, 1999, C:105) can
be analysed as a sign whose signifier is the observed motor
behaviour, and whose signified is the tactical, relational, or
referential sense. The semiotor logic of team sporting games is
essentially different from the “natural semiotricity” of outdoor
pursuits, the “referential semiotricity” of body expression and
mime, and the “socio-affective semiotricity” of paradoxical games
(S:43), but they all share the same semiotic, cognitive structure.
Motor conducts are bodily expressions of a personality in
endless interaction with their vital circumstances, signs that
can also be interpreted by competent teachers as a level of
competence, a learning outcome, a trait of character, emotional
state, relational status, tactical decision, etc. Nonetheless, the
competitive logic of sports forces to take them as “motor
decisions” (D:5) to be assessed in terms of strategical and tactical
efficacies. Semiotor angle is the only valid perspective to address
the metacommunicative nature of sports interaction: a game
establishes a normative layer of direct motor communication
that regulates the material limits of interaction (i.e., tackling,
charging, passing, hitting, shooting, etc.), on top of which the
players’ intentions are built and evolve. This “indirect praxic
communication” (Parlebas, 1999, C:65) is a battle of signs
called “praxems” (P:26) through which individuals and teams
try to outwit their adversaries in a constant game of guesses,
deceptions, and make-beliefs. This process, far from being magic,
can be traced and trained from very young ages, like in football
(Oboeuf et al., 2019).
Understanding is best, if not only, conceived as the semiotic
performance that allows players to infer and interfere with
other players’ intentions on a bodily basis, and teaching is best
conceived as a thoughtful process of building up semiotor habits
that provides the players with the competence to anticipate and
pre-act efficiently on pitches and courts where everybody can be
fooled. Understanding is interpreting, and interpretation is the
outcome that results in “motor conducts” as far as an individual
agent is concerned, and in “motor action” as far as the whole
situation is concerned. Any motor behaviour, or articulation of
motor behaviours, is a Peircean “motor interpretant” (Martínez-
Santos, 2007) that participates in a triadic, indexical relationship
with the rest of the motor behaviours of the situation.
Furthermore, social uncertainty and sociomotor intelligence are
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bound together by the essential randomness attached to subjects;
the only certainty attached to opposition games that Koppet
(1973) so wisely identified in basketball is that “the essence of the
game is deception”: the only way to learn to play these games is by
understanding that signs never lie, but opponents always try to.
On Teaching as Communication
It is also a tradition to propose traditional games to teach
sports. So did Sleap (1984) for mini-sports, and Mahlo (1969)
for the tactical act, who surprisingly made compatible disdain
and appreciation for them when saying that the relatively simple
“little games” prepare for team sports: “A qualitatively superior
mean of development and physical education, and an important
form of cultural activity of human society” (p. 149). However,
team sports, such as football, basketball, and handball, make a
perfect intervention strategy for a teaching traditional sporting
games, and teachers can increase its beneficial effect by using an
adequate teaching style for understanding. This is what Parlebas
and Dugas (1998) were able to prove through a fully controlled
piece of experimental research. “Learning transfer: the effect that
can be observed when the execution of an activity modifies,
positively or negatively, the accomplishment of a new activity
or the reproduction of an old one” (Parlebas, 1999, T:90) is the
cornerstone of teaching and PE, understood as an after-effects
searching, deliberate motor intervention practice.
Teaching can be conceived as a communicative process
between teacher and learner through practice tasks (Martínez-
Santos, 2018): teacher and learner are indirectly connected
through the internal logic of the exercises selected by the
former, and directly connected by the logic of face-to-face
communication between them, as explained by Poyatos (1994).
Taken two by two, these three elements (namely, “teacher,”
“learner,” and practice “task”) generate the three basic dimensions
of any intervention process: the design and selection of tasks,
that is, the strategic dimension, corresponds to the axis “teacher-
task”; the praxic dimension corresponds to the motor action the
emerges from the axis “task-learner”; the axis “learner–teacher”
corresponds to the stylistic dimension, the many ways in which
educational instruction can be managed. In this vein, TGfU
may seem more a style-based proposal, whereas praxeological
proposal primarily strategic, but this could be an illusion due
to its presentation as a six-ordered-phase model of teaching
(Bunker and Thorpe, 1982) and its illustration with teacher–
student dialogues (Almond, 1986). Even so, this would not be as
bad as the “illusion [that] haunts stadiums and gyms: educators
tend to think that the nature of the activities matters little, that
it is just a simple means at the service of the chosen educational
purposes, that teachers have full powers over them. In fact, the
master of the game is not the teacher, but the game: a system of
rules that imposes its dictates; a system that has its own logic and
defines the universe of actions and permitted conducts” (1979:
Parlebas, 2017, p. 383).
Far from any nature vs. nurture kind of battle, but as close
to didactical falsifiability as possible, we can be certain that
the absence in practice of key aspects of the games makes
developing the targeted competences most unlikely. Twenty years
ago McMorris concluded: “With regard to which method [TGfU
or technical] is the better for teaching games, the evidence
is inconclusive and much more research is necessary. The
research into net games suggests that neither method is more
successful than the other for those activities. For team games
the lack of research makes it impossible to make a definitive
statement” (McMorris, 1998, p. 70). We feel concerned too by his
conclusions: “Overall it could be argued that TGfU has directly
provided little or nothing new to the motor learning literature.
[. . .] However, specificity of practice should not be ignored and
modifying in TGfU style, e.g., playing ‘hockey’ without sticks,
violates specificity and could lead to negative transfer of training
when the real game is introduced [. . .] The decision as to which
method the teacher adopts is more a philosophical one than one
based on empirical evidence” (p. 71).
Peirce could hardly agree with McMorris’ last statement.
According to his pragmatist maxim, the highest level of clarity
can only be attained by putting concepts like teaching and
transfer to the test of learning outcomes’ reality. On our part, we
must disagree with McMorris because Parlebas and Dugas have
provided us of empirical evidence that the content of practice
matters (Figure 3): athletics is not the basis of all sports, and
internal and external logics of games are independent in terms of
learning transfer (Parlebas and Dugas, 1998; Dugas, 2001, 2006,
2010). A classic experimental design, with full control over the
grouping (i.e., age, gender, sports experience, academic level)
and didactical (teaching strategy and style) variables, allowed
them to pre-test and post-test the sociomotor competence in
traditional and institutionalised team games after eight sessions
practising traditional games, sports, or athletics (control groups).
The results are crystal clear: firstly, structural similarity between
team duels produced positive learning outcome in all groups
(A–D), regardless of whether they were tested in sports (A
and B) or traditional games (C and D), regardless of whether
practice consisted of sports (A and C) or traditional games
(B and D); secondly, the practice of psychomotor activities
(athletics) produced no change on the sociomotor competence
associated with playing team games; and, finally, the teaching
for understanding, semiotor style produced higher learning levels
than a ludic one in all experimental groups (Asemiotic > Aludic;
Bsemiotic > Bludic; Csemiotic > Cludic; and Dsemiotic > Dludic).
Even more, the structure of praxemic interaction, which is
the core of the motor competence of teams sports, is the
best scaffolding for teachers and coaches to teach players: to
be aware of their own intentions, to recognise the playing
circumstances, and to articulate their conducts with the other
players’ intentions (Martínez-Santos, 2007).
In brief, these results are most valuable for three reasons:
firstly, they prove that the internal logic of educational activities
overcomes the external features of their practice, for example
social recognition or economic value; secondly, they show that
the internal features of the tasks created by the rules determine
the limits of sociomotor learning transfer; and finally, they
reinforce the belief that there exists such a thing as teaching
for understanding. As we said, TGfU seems to lean more on
teaching-style than on teaching-strategy, although Almond took
great advantage of the distinction that Suits made between games’
primary rules (constitutive) and secondary rules (operational)
to help his students in games making (Harvey et al., 2018,
p. 170). Besides, their remarks on the praxic consequences of
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FIGURE 3 | Learning transfer, traditional games, and sports (Dugas, 2001).
rules modifications (Thorpe et al., 1986) are the very essence of
the strategic dimension of teaching based on the praxeological
modification of games. We already said that this is a tale about
two perspectives driven on parallel tracks for too long despite the
overwhelming quantity of coincidences.
ONE TALE, TWO STORIES, AND THREE
CONCLUSION
Traditional games can produce the same kind of learning
outcomes than sports, and there is no difference between their
practice regarding the benefits of a semiotic, understanding style
of teaching. The development of thinking players cannot be an
educational objective, but the development of thinking citizens
can be better attained through the development of the intelligence
associated with sociomotor action, a venture in which traditional
games have a world to offer. Evidently, we have no answer to the
question we asked ourselves in the first place: Why are traditional
games absent from the TGfU rationale? but we truly believe
that TGfU advocates and practitioners can agree with us that
traditional games have an immense educational value that should
not be taken for granted. The what, the how, and the why of games
in PE are better understood if we take traditional games as a
contrast, as an option, and as a choice: as a contrast, to notice that
sports, that is, institutionalised games, are nothing but a subset
of physical games and activities; as an option when it comes
to teaching sports, a venture in which traditional games offer
outstanding, most transferable learning opportunities; and as a
choice, because the structural variability that traditional games
offer is remarkable from an educational, cultural point of view.
Teaching-games-for-understanding and motor praxeology
represent two different solutions to the scientific-foundations-of-
PE problem, although we feel enforced to contest Peter Watson,
who asserts in his superb intellectual history of the twentieth
century: “Many continental thinkers, especially French and from
the German-speaking lands, were devoted to the marriage of
Freud and Marx, one of the main intellectual preoccupations
of the century, and maybe the biggest dead end, or folly,
which affected, in France most of all, of blinding thinkers
to the advances in the harder sciences. This has created a
cultural divide in intellectual terms between francophone and
anglophone thought” (Watson, 2001, p. 753). True as it may
be, for one of the most beautiful texts by Parlebas – Sporting
game, dream and fantasy (Parlebas, 1975) – is built upon the
Freudian triad Id, ego, and super-ego, it is also true that he
very much looks like a classic scientist in the Foucauldian sense
(Foucault, 1991, p. 7), for his relentless search for mathematical
formalisation and conceptual clarification of sporting games and
motor action (Martínez-Santos, 2017).
McMorris eventually accepts that TGfU raises “a number
of very important issues that motor learning discipline
needs to address” (McMorris, 1998, p. 71), like ecological
validity, task complexity and transfer, implicit learning, and
transfer of games’ principles. However, in doing so, maybe
unintentionally, McMorris also reinforces the serfdom so
many in the Academy expect from physical educationists.
The academic world is made of fundamental sciences and self-
proclaimed fundamental scientists like anatomists, physiologists,
phycologists, sociologists, philosophers, historians, etc., from
whom teachers, trainers, coaches, sports monitors, etc., all of
them devoted practitioners, must learn and apply concepts,
theories, and evidence. TGfU has received critics for its
alleged lack of theoretical soundness (Harvey et al., 2018),
but it could be argued that none of its relatives (Butler et al.,
2008) or contenders (Renshaw et al., 2015; Jarrett and Harvey,
2016) has shown either much interest in developing an
autonomous, specific understanding of what sporting games
playing involves from the agent’s perspective. We believe
that understanding in TGfU and game-based approaches
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still remains unexplored while admitting, at the same time, that
TGfU can perfectly hold out against critics and gain fundamental
conceptual insight if opened up to semiotor perspective and
traditional games.
In this sense, our last conclusion is that TGfU and game-based
approaches can take great advantage of the motor-praxeological
rationale for three key reasons: firstly, because concepts like
understanding, game sense, and action principles are operatively
conceived, that is, semiotically linked to the reality of the playing
process; secondly, because the inner structures of the games
that constrain players and guide their motor conducts permit to
integrate team sports in the general system of sporting games,
no matter their level of institutionalisation; and, finally, because
teaching practice is better thought of and more systematically
developed upon the operational concepts of internal logic,
expected outcomes of game playing, and teaching style. This
time, unlike in Dickens’ novel, Paris could be the place to go
to in search of solutions, not the city to run away from in
hope of consolation.
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